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Georgia Governor (Jos. E. Brown) 1857-6

ANNUAL MESSAGE
OF
GOVERNOR JOSEPH E. BROWN,
TO THE
GEORGIA LEGISLATURE.
ASSEMBLED NOVEMBER 3RD, 1864.



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MESSAGE.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, }
MILLEDGEVILLE, GA., NOV. 3D, 1864. }

Senators and Representatives:

The period for your annual meeting in General Assembly having arrived, it affords me great pleasure to welcome you to the Capitol, and to assure you of my earnest desire to unite with you harmoniously and cordially in all practical measures which may promote the general welfare, and redound to the glory and honor of our beloved State.

We are passing through a trying ordeal, having staked upon the issues of war all that can be valuable or dear to a people. If we are subjugated, we lose home, property, liberty, reputation, and all, so far as this world is concerned, that makes life desirable or its burdens tolerable.

Our enemies have repudiated and trampled under foot the great principles of constitutional liberty, and have attempted to rear, upon the ruins of our republican institutions, a consolidated empire, under the popular name of a union of the States. We have taken up arms to resist this, and to maintain republicanism in its purity, with the sovereignty of the States and the personal rights and liberties of the people. No people ever accepted the alternative of war in a nobler cause, or exhibited to the world a more sublime spectacle of moral grandeur and heroic valor. Our gallant armies have won for these States a name which will stand upon a bright page in history, when pyramids have decayed, and marble monuments have crumbled into dust. It should be the pleasure of the patriot and pride of the hero to contribute his property, his energies, and, if need be, his life, for the success of so noble a cause. Upon our success depends the last hope of republican institutions and civil liberty, with constitutional guarantees. He who would prove recreant to so sacred a cause, or from a desire of personal aggrandizement or the gratification of personal ambition, would trample under his feet and sacrifice these great principles which underlie the very foundations of our

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federative system, and upon the success of which the happiness of unborn millions depends, deserves an eternity of infamy with the everlasting execrations of mankind upon his head.

As a band of patriots, let us unite all our energies and exert all our influence for the success of our glorious cause, and for the maintenance in their original purity of the great principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the very pillars upon which the temple of our republicanism rests.

CONFEDERATE RELATIONS.

The war is still waged against the people of the Confederate States, by the Government of the United States, with a vindictiveness and cruelty which has few parallels in history. For nearly four years we have met the mighty assaults of the Federal armies, and have repulsed and driven them back on many a hard-fought field. We have lost important points, but none which we can not temporarily surrender to the enemy, and, with good management, finally succeed. Atlanta was probably the most vital point to our success that has been won by the superior numbers of the enemy. Its fall was a severe blow, and for a time caused great despondency among our people. I am happy to see, however, that they are fast recovering from depression, and confidence is being restored.

At the time of General Sherman's march from Dalton to Atlanta, we had a large force west of the Mississippi of as gallant troops as ever faced an enemy, which had been almost in a state of inactivity, since our splendid victories in Louisiana last spring had driven the enemy, except a few garrisons, from that department. Major General Early is said to have had a force of 20,000 men, of the very best of the Army in Virginia, with which he drove the Federal General out of the valley of that State, and pressed forward into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and remained there till his presence provoked those and the adjoining States to organize a force sufficient to drive him back and to threaten Richmond in the rear. General Forrest, with a large cavalry force, was operating in North Mississippi, repelling raids from a country that had been overrun till there was but little public property for the enemy to destroy; and General Morgan was raiding in Kentucky. While our forces were thus scattered from Pennsylvania to Texas, Gen'l Sherman, strengthened by a concentration of the enemy's forces from different departments, was steadily pressing forward to Atlanta, the very heart and railroad centre of the Confederacy, with a force sufficient, by reason of its superior numbers, to continually flank and drive back the gallant Army of Tennessee. During this whole campaign, General Sherman's base of supplies at Nashville and Louisville was hundreds of miles in his rear, and he was dependent for

transportation upon a railroad constructed through an exceedingly rough country, with bridges, culverts and curves along its entire line. In this condition, more than three hundred miles from the border of Kentucky, in the midst of an enemy's country, he was permitted to go forward, without serious interruption in his rear, and to accomplish his grand design.

Georgians, whose homes have been overrun, property destroyed, and fields laid waste, have naturally inquired, as doubtless the future historians will, why part of the large force unemployed west of the Mississippi were not brought to aid the Army of Tennessee during the summer months? And why, when the enemy were driven from the Valley of Virginia, the key points were not garrisoned and held by part of Early's force, and the balance sent to Georgia, instead of the whole being sent upon the campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania, which only served to stir up and unite Northern sentiment against us, and to enable the Federal Government to raise an additional force sufficient to drive back the expedition with disaster to our arms. If this whole force could be spared from Richmond to invade Pennsylvania, might not part of it have held the Valley of Virginia, and the balance been sent to Georgia? And could not Forrest, even at the expense of temporary loss in Mississippi, have been sent to destroy the railroads in the rear, and stop the supplies of the Federal army? If we had adopted the rule by which most great Generals in such emergencies have succeeded, of the evacuation for the time of all points not absolutely vital, and the rapid and vigorous concentration of every soldier in the Confederacy not necessary to hold Richmond and probably one or two other key points, and had hastened the whole to Atlanta and to Sherman's rear, and hurled them upon him in his exposed and critical condition, the repulse and rout, if not the destruction or capture, of his army could scarcely have been doubtful. And as his army was the only defence provided by the Federal Government for the Western States, such a consummation would not only have relieved Georgia, Tennessee, North Alabama and North Mississippi from the presence of the enemy, but it would have thrown open the "green fields" of Kentucky which have been more than once promised to our troops, and would probably have opened the way for an early peace. The powers that be determined upon a different line of policy. The world knows the results, and we must acquiesce. But the misfortunes following the misguided judgment of our rulers must not have the effect of relaxing our zeal, or chilling our love for the cause.

We may, as we have a right to do, differ among ourselves as to the wisdom of a certain line of policy, and of certain

acts of the Confederate administration; and some of us may deplore its errors and mismanagement, while others may attempt to justify all its mistakes and defend all its errors, and may be ready in advance to approve everything it may do, and still we may all, as one man, remain true to our sacred cause, and be prepared, if necessary, to expend our last dollar and shed our last drop of blood in its defence.

While I am satisfied a large majority of the people of this State disapprove many of the acts and much of the policy of the Confederate administration, I am of opinion there are but a very small number of the people of Georgia who are disloyal to the cause, or who would consent to close the war without the achievement of the great ends for which we took up arms—the independence of the Confederate States and the vindication and establishment of the sovereignty of the several States.

Confederate independence with centralized power, without Statesovereignty and constitutional and religious liberty, would be very little better than subjugation, as it matters little who our master is, if we are to have one. We should therefore keep constantly in view the great principles upon which we entered into this unequal contest, and should rebuke every encroachment made upon them by our own government, while we resist, with arms in our hands, like assaults made upon them by our enemies. While our gallant troops in the field are sacrificing the comforts of home, property, health and even life itself, and are enduring all the privations, hardships, perils and dangers of the service, they should never once lose sight of the great principles of equality, liberty, and constitutional republicanism, for which they unfurled freedom's banners in the face of the enemy. Nor should they ever consent to lay down their arms till these principles are recognized by our foe, and faithfully carried out in practice by our own government. In other words, we should never be content till we have established upon a firm basis the good old republican institutions of our fathers in all their purity, and should never, under any circumstances, consent to accept in their place strong centralized government with military despotism. I do not see how it can be denied by any candid man that we have, in practice, made fearful strides, since the war began, towards a centralized government with unlimited powers.

The constant tendencies of the war seem to have been to the subordination of the civil authorities and laws to the military, and the concentration of the supreme power in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies. The longer the war lasts, the greater the tendency to this result, and the less probability at its termination of a return to the constitutional forms and republican simplicity which existed at its commencement.

But it may be asked, when is this bloody struggle to terminate? No human forecast can so far penetrate the future as to give a satisfactory reply to this question. The Northern States have resources and men enough to enable them to continue the war for years to come, and we have sufficient power of resistance and endurance to enable us to continue to baffle all their schemes of subjugation. The sword can never make peace between the two contending parties. When this is done, it will be by *negotiation*. The prospect seems to indicate that the war may probably last till both sections are exhausted, before the passions of the people will subside, and reason so far resume her sway as to prepare the people of both countries for negotiation, as the only means of adjustment which can terminate the bloody strife. This may not take place till we have accumulated a debt on both sides greater than we or our posterity can ever pay—till hundreds of thousands more men have been slain, and millions of women and children have been reduced to widowhood, orphanage and poverty—till our taxes have become so burdensome, that endurance is no longer possible—till the civil laws cease to be respected, and highway robbery and murder are the daily business of predatory bands, and till the Federal and Confederate governments have usurped and exercise all the powers claimed by the most absolute despots, each pleading in extenuation of its usurpations the necessity growing out of the like usurpations by the other.

There is reason to fear that President Lincoln, if re-elected, and President Davis, whose passions are inflamed against each other, may never be able to agree upon terms for the commencement of negotiations, and that the war must continue to rage in all its fury till there is a change of administration, unless the people of both countries, in their aggregate capacity as sovereign States, bring their powerful influence to bear, requiring both governments to stop the war, and leave the question to be settled upon the principles of 1776, as laid down in the Georgia resolutions, passed at your late session.

These resolutions, in substance, propose that the treaty making powers in both governments agree to stop the war, and leave each or any one of the sovereign States, by a convention of its own people, fairly chosen by the legal and duly qualified voters, to determine for itself whether it will unite its destinies with the one or the other Confederacy. There may be doubts whether Missouri, Kentucky, or Maryland wish to remain component parts of the government of the United States, or to unite with the Confederate States. If either one of those States shall refuse to unite with us, we have no just right to demand such union, as we have neither the right to coerce a sovereign State, nor to govern

her without her consent. And, if we had the right, we certainly have not the power, as we can only govern a State without her consent by subjugation, and we have no power to subjugate any one of those States, with the whole power of the United States at her back, prepared to defend her against our attacks.

We should stand ready therefore at all times to settle the difficulty by a reference of the question of future alliance, to the States whose positions may be doubtful for determination by them in their sovereign capacity.

Our Congress in its manifesto has virtually indorsed the great principles of the Georgia Resolutions, and the President has said in his messages that he desires peace upon the principles to defend which we entered into the struggle. I am not aware however, of any direct tender of adjustment, upon these principles having been recently made by the treaty making power of our Government to the same power in the Federal Government. I regret that the wish of Georgia as expressed through her legislature has not been respected in this particular. Such a direct tender made through commissioners by President Davis to President Lincoln would place the question fairly and properly before the States and people of the North for discussion and action. Had it been done months since it could not have failed to have had a powerful influence upon the Presidential election in the North, which may have much to do with the future course and conduct of the war.

It may be said however, that the proposition to settle our difficulties upon these terms made by President Davis to President Lincoln, would be a letting down of the dignity of our Government, and might be construed as an evidence of conscious weakness on our part. I confess my inability to see how the *direct* tender of settlement upon these great and correct principles by the treaty making power in our Government, to the like power in the United States Government, could compromise the dignity of our Government, any more than an *indirect* tender of the same proposition through the irregular channel of an Executive message or a Congressional manifesto.

There is certainly more true dignity in a direct openly tender through the constituted channel. But nice questions of official etiquette and false notions of personal dignity should be laid aside, when they intervene to prevent action upon which the blood of thousands and the happiness of millions may depend.

The democratic party of the North which is the only party there claiming to maintain State right principles and which has great strength and power whatever may be its fortunes in the coming election, has declared in favor of a

suspension of hostilities, and a convention of all the States as the best means of adjustment. And I see no good reason why the treaty making power in our Government should not tender this proposition to the Government of the United States. There can certainly be nothing like humiliation or degradation in a proposition to leave the settlement of a question which the General Governments, which are the creatures of the States, can not agree upon, to their creators—the sovereign States themselves.

However much the idea may be ridiculed to prejudice the popular mind by the enemies of state sovereignty, the convention if called would no doubt be one of the most able and dignified assemblages that ever met upon the continent. In so trying an emergency, involving issues of such immense magnitude, the States would doubtless select their wisest ablest and best men to represent them, men whose passions have been subdued by age and reflection, and who are alike distinguished for love of justice, balance of mind and dignity of character. Such a convention composed of the greatest and best men of the country, of mature age and large experience, with the scenes of blood, carnage and desolation through which we have passed fresh in their recollection, and the present and prospective condition of the country well known to them, could hardly be expected to decide in favor of a continuation of the war, with all its blighting effects upon both the North and the South, or to adjourn without submitting a plan of settlement honorable and just to the people of both Confederacies, and to all the States.

All questions of boundary, and inland navigation, and all treaties of amity, commerce, and alliance, and all agreements necessary to preserve in future the just balance of power upon the continent, could be properly shaped in such a convention and proposed to the treaty making powers as the result of its deliberations. Or it might be agreed in advance by the treaty making powers that the convention settle the whole question and that its action be final and conclusive when submitted back to the people of the several States and ratified by them respectively.

In that event it must of course be understood that each State would enter the convention as a separate independent Sovereign—the equal of every other State,—and that the action of the body as in case of the conventions which formed the constitutions of the United States and of the Confederate States would only be binding upon each State, when submitted back to and freely ratified by the people thereof in their sovereign capacity.

The propriety of submitting the question by the treaty making powers to a convention of the Sovereign States is the more obvious, in view of the want of power in the

Presidents and Senates of the two Governments to make a treaty of peace without the consent of the sovereign States to be affected by it. No permanent treaty of peace can be made which does not contain an article fixing the boundaries of the two Governments, when the whole country is inhabited as ours is, and one or the other Government must exercise immediate jurisdiction over the inhabitants of each State and each county. In other words we can have no treaty of peace that does not define the States or parts of States that are to be embraced in each Government. And this can only be done by the consent of the States themselves. The action of *separate States* is therefore an indispensable preliminary to the validity of any treaty of peace that can be made. This action may by agreement of the treaty making powers take place prior or subsequent to the date of the treaty, but in either case the effect is the same, as the validity of the treaty is dependent upon the action of *Separate States*.

Suppose for instance it is agreed by the treaty making powers that the State of Ohio shall become part of the Confederate States, when an overwhelming majority of her people in convention called by the proper State authority, decide by solemn ordinance to remain with the United States. Or suppose it is agreed by the treaty making powers that Kentucky shall remain part of the United States, when two thirds of her people decide to go with the Confederate States. Will any one contend that the treaty making power has the right thus to dispose of States, and assign them their future positions without their consent? And will any body say that a treaty of peace can be made without defining the Government with which Ohio or Kentucky shall be associated in future?

Suppose again that the treaty making powers in fixing the boundaries of the two Confederacies should agree to a division of Virginia, and that the territory embraced in the pretended new State formed of part of Virginia, shall become part of the United States, and that the balance shall go with the Confederate States. Will any southern man contend that she can be thus dismembered and part of her territory ceded by the President and Senate to the Government of the United States without her consent? He who so contends denies the very fundamental principles upon which the Government of the Confederate States was organized. What would the old Virginians of the Jeffersonian School say to this sort of State Sovereignty? What would Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Henry, Lee, Mason, Randolph, and other Statesmen of their day have said, if they had been told that the constitution of the United States conferred upon the treaty making power, the

right to cede one half the territory of Virginia to a foreign State, without consulting her or obtaining her consent?

If President Davis and the Senate have the power to cede part of Virginia to the United States in fixing the boundaries of the two Confederacies without her consent, they have as much power to cede the whole State to Great Britain or France for commercial advantages. Or to cede Georgia to the United States in consideration that the other States shall be recognized and the war cease. Such a proposition is too preposterous for serious argument.

He who claims such powers for the President and Senate, would not only degrade the States to the position of provinces, but would clothe the treaty making power of the Confederacy with imperial dignity greater than the most enlightened monarchs of the present day assume to themselves. It has been claimed as one of the prerogatives of sovereigns that they could cede to each other their provinces at will. But in the late treaty between the Emperors of France and Austria the former refused to accept a province ceded by the latter, and incorporate it into his Empire and govern it till the question was submitted to the people of the Province and they gave their consent.

It is certainly too clear to be successfully questioned that the Governments of the two Confederacies have no power to make a treaty of peace and fix the boundaries of the two countries, which, situated as we are is a necessary part of the treaty, without the concurrence and consent of the individual States to be affected by it. If this can not be done without the consent of the States, where is the objection to a convention of the States to settle in advance the necessary preliminaries to which their consent is indispensable before the treaty can be valid and binding? In the convention it could be agreed which States would go with the North and which with the South, and the ratification of the action of the convention by the treaty making powers, and by the people of the several States to be affected by it, when of a character to require their separate action, would fix the future *status* of the different States, and the proper boundaries of the two Confederacies.

While I am satisfied that separate State action may and most probably will be a necessary preliminary to a treaty of peace, I do not wish to be misunderstood upon this point. The sovereign States of the Confederacy each seceded from the old union. This they had a perfect right to do. And each is as sovereign in the present Confederacy as she was in the old, and has the same right under the like circumstances which she then exercised. But when these states seceded and formed the present Confederacy, and entered into the present defensive war together, they at least by strong implication, pledged themselves to stand by and aid each

other against the common enemy till the end of the struggle. Thus situated I deny that any one of the States can honorably withdraw from the contest, without the consent of her sister states and make a separate treaty of peace with the enemy.

The people of the States can meet in convention and abolish the Confederate Government whenever its usurpations and abuses of power have reached a point, where the sovereignty of the States and the rights and liberties of the people are no longer secure under it. The people of the Northern Government have a right to do the same by a like convention, and to establish a new Government in place of the present tyranny by which they are controlled.

If the people of the two Confederacies have this power which will not I presume be denied by any one professing the State rights doctrines of 1776, why may they not meet together in convention, and agree upon the boundaries and treaties necessarily growing out of a separation which is already an accomplished fact?

I am well aware that the advocates of strong central power both in the United States and the Confederate States, including many of the office holders of both governments, and the place hunters and large government contractors who have made millions of dollars out of the government, without once exposing their persons to danger in battle, and the secret spies in the employment of the governments who are supported out of the large *secret service* funds at the command of the two Presidents, to do their bidding, and such officials as wear gold lace in cities and drive fine horses and carriages supported out of the public crib, while all around them is misery and want; and the large provost and passport corps, scattered among our country villages and upon our Railroads, jealous of the prerogatives of the central power, and anxious to maintain and extend them, are ready by their action to deny that the States have anything left but the name, or that they can have any agency in negotiating a treaty of peace, or that they can meet in convention to consider of this subject without being guilty as "traitorous States." Those minions of power protected from the dangers of the battle field, never fail to impugn the motives and question the loyalty of every one who denies the legality of any act of the government, or questions the wisdom of any part of its policy.

They very cordially adopt the maxim "the King can do no wrong." Of course all such are loud and clamorous in their denunciations of those who advocate a convention of States to agree upon the terms of separation and stop the effusion of blood. If the war should cease they must sink to their natural level, for then, "Othello's occupation's gone."

But the advocates of free government may safely appeal from all such to the sober sound judgment of the great mass of the American people, North and South, who bear the heavy burdens of the war, without the offices or patronage of either government, whose sons have been conscribed and torn from them and slaughtered, many of whose homes have been destroyed, and their farms and cities laid waste, who are daily robbed of their property by impressment agents or other government officials, without paying them anything for it, who bear the burdens of the enormous taxation necessary to carry on the war, and support all the large classes above mentioned in extravagant indulgences, and whose posterity and property must pay the immense public debt which is constantly augmented. And the appeal may be made with still greater force to the gallant soldier in the storms of winter and in the weary march, while amid the perils that surround him his thoughts recur to the sufferings of loved ones at home; as well as to all true christians in both countries. Shall this bloodshed, carnage and desolation continue, to gratify the ambition and obstinacy of those in power? Or shall the people of both countries demand of their rulers that the war shall cease, and as it is impossible that the people of the two sections can again live together in harmony, that a convention of all the States be held to agree upon terms of separation, and upon the treaties necessary to the happiness and prosperity of neighboring governments at peace with each other.

We may be told that the Northern Government will not agree to such a convention. I very readily admit that neither the Lincoln Government nor our own will probably agree to it, till a stronger pressure of the people is brought to bear upon both, and that the advocates of this policy in the North cannot control it so long as our presses and officials, State and Confederate, denounce the movement and thereby put weapons in the hands of the Government at Washington with which to crush out this growing sentiment in the North, and more especially in the North Western States. But I think recent developments have shown that this doctrine will soon bear down every thing before it in the North, if met by demonstrations of approval in the South. Stop the war and call a convention of the States to negotiate, and the people of the North who are as tired of it as we are, will agree to a proper adjustment upon the terms above indicated sooner than resume hostilities.

In the mean time till proper arrangements can be made to adjust our difficulties and stop the effusion of blood by negotiation, it is the duty of every man in the Confederacy to do everything possibly in his power to strengthen and sustain the gallant and glorious armies of States and the Confederacy. Every man able to bear arms who can be

spared from home, should be sent to the Front either in the armies of the Confederacy or as part of the Militia of the States and everything possible be done to provide for the wants and comfort of our troops in the field and their loved ones at home. To enable us to conduct negotiations successfully we must renew our efforts to strengthen our armies and maintain our cause with ability and energy in the field, cost what it may in blood or treasure. We must not, however, expect the troops to do all by hard fighting, bloodshed and the sacrifice of life. The Statesman and the people at home have an important part to act, as well as the General and the troops in the field in terminating the struggle. If the troops falter and fail to do their part in the hour of battle, the Statesman is ready to cast censure upon them. If the Statesman neglects his part in conducting wise negotiations to stop the war, the troops have greater cause to censure and condemn him, as he has no right to trifle with their lives, and continue to expose them in battle, if the object can be attained by negotiation without the shedding of blood. In a crisis like the present Statesmanship is even more important than Generalship. Generals can never stop a war, though it may last twenty years till one has been able to conquer the other. Statesmen terminate wars by negotiation.

BLOCKADE RUNNING.

After the appropriation made by the General Assembly for the exportation of cotton and the importation of such supplies of clothing for troops, cotton cards, &c., as the State might need I sent Col. Wm. Schly of Augusta to England to purchase an interest in a Steamer. Finding that he was not successful by reason of the non-compliance of the other party in getting the vessel for half interest, in which I had contracted at \$185,000 in Confederate States 8 per cent bonds, I made a contract with the Exporting and Importing Company of which Col. C. A. L. Lamar, was agent for the charter of three vessels, with the privilege of adding two others which the company expected to have ready in a few months.

This contract I considered advantageous to the State, and if left free to carry it out I could have exported cotton enough to have purchased all the supplies the State might need, and could have imported them upon reasonable terms.

At this point I was interrupted by the interposition of the Secretary of the Treasury, who under the order of the President refused to permit any vessel to clear unless she carried out one half the cargo for the Confederate Government upon terms which were below what the State was to pay for the use of the vessels. This restriction was placed

upon the vessels of the States as it was said, by authority vested in the President by act of Congress of 6th, Feby. 1864 which prohibits the exportation of Cotton, &c., except under such uniform regulations as shall be made by the President of the Confederate States. This construction could not be sustained however, upon any known rule, as the 5th section of the act declares explicitly "that nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the Confederate States or any of them from exporting any of the articles herein enumerated on their own account." This provision in the act therefore leaves the States as free to export on their own account either upon vessels owned or chartered by them, as they were before the act was passed. But as the proviso in the act had been virtually repealed by an Executive order, I in common with the Governors of Mississippi, Alabama and North Carolina, (the Governor of South Carolina concurring as shown by his letter) appealed to Congress to take up the question and make such provisions as would enable the States to exercise their just rights. After mature consideration Congress passed a bill for that purpose which the President vetoed. Congress then as I am informed by one of the Representatives of this State passed a resolution unanimously in the House, and with almost unanimity in the Senate, declaring in substance that the States should be permitted to export and import without interruption upon vessels chartered by them prior to the date of the resolution, which would have left the vessels chartered by this State free. This resolution was passed near the close of the session, and the President refused, as the member informs me either to sign it or to return it, that Congress might be permitted to vote to overrule his veto. Thus by the order of the Executive alone, notwithstanding the action of Congress and the provision in the 5th Section of the act above referred to, the States were prohibited from exporting cotton and importing blankets and clothing for their troops, and other necessary supplies, unless they would conform to such rules as the President thought proper to prescribe. These rules I could not conform to under the provisions of the contract made with the exporting and importing company without heavy loss to the State. As I was thus prohibited by act of the Confederate Government from carrying out the contract, I could not insist upon the exclusive use and control of the vessels. Finding the Exportations of the State forbidden by the Lincoln Blockade, and placed under a partial blockade by our own Executive, I encountered great embarrassment in carrying out the instructions of the legislature in this particular. If the Company were compelled to submit to the terms prescribed by the President, and give up one half the storage room of the steamers chartered by the State, to the Confederacy, they were un-

willing to divide the remaining half allowed them by the President with the State. By allowing the company to use the name of the State in their business which under the circumstances I felt justified in doing, and by undertaking to aid them when necessary in the transportation of cotton to the coast, I was enabled to get them, after submitting to the terms imposed by the Confederate Government, to carry out occasional lots for the State, upon the vessels owned by them. I have also through the agency of Col. A. Wilbur, exported some upon small vessels from the coast of this State. I have given one half to the vessels for carrying out the other. Owing to the difficulties in getting letters from the other side, I have not yet received statements of the sales with the net amount of gold on deposit to the credit of the State in England. Should the sale bills and accounts current be received prior to your adjournment I will immediately lay them before the General Assembly.

About three hundred bales of cotton were shipped upon the Little Ada, (a steamer chartered by the State,) upon the coast of South Carolina. This vessel after she had been loaded with State cotton, was detained in Port between two and three months by order of the Secretary of the Treasury, supported as I am informed by a military order from the office of the Adjutant General in Richmond, to the commandant of the Port, not to permit her to clear. Thus this State vessel was doubly blockaded and threatened by Confederate guns in the harbor and by Federal guns out side, if she attempted to go to sea with State cotton to pay for blankets to be imported for Georgia troops in service who have great need of them.

A complete statement of the amount expended by the State for the purchase of cotton, with the quantity purchased under the appropriations, and the average cost per pound, together with the number of bales exported on account of the State, and the number now in store, with account of expenditures for storage, freight, insurance, lighterage, haggling, rope, compressing, &c, &c., will be laid before the finance committee during the session. They are not transmitted herewith because reports of the agents with accounts current have not all been received.

I have purchased and had stored on one of the Islands 30,000 pairs of cotton cards, and 30,000 soldiers blankets. I have also made contracts for soldiers clothing, enough I trust with what are on hand to carry the troops through the winter without suffering. Part of our goods were lost a few days since near Charleston with the Florie, but I hope soon to be able to import the balance.

I have lately been informed by Mr. Trenholm the present liberal minded practical Secretary of the Treasury, that *vessels owned* by the State, will be permitted to clear with-

out interruption by the Confederate Government. Were the question an original one, I can not doubt that Mr. Trevelyan with the act of Congress, before him would decide, that a vessel chartered by a State has the same right to a clearance, as no substantial distinction can be drawn between the right of a State to export upon a vessel owned, and one chartered by her, which is a temporary ownership. Nor can I suppose that this financial officer would willingly throw obstacles in the way of the States in making all the importations in their power. Take the case of Georgia as an instance. Her sons are in the field. They need blankets, shoes, clothing and other necessities. The Confederate Government is often unable to furnish these, and they suffer for them. The State by her legislature says her sons shall not suffer, and if the Confederate Government can not supply these necessary articles, she will. She appropriates money for that purpose, and directs part of her surplus productions exported to pay for these articles, which she directs to be imported. She charters her vessels, purchases cotton with her own money, and places it on board, to be carried abroad at her own risk and expense, to purchase that she may import, at her own risk and cost, the articles necessary to the comfort of her own gallant sons who are under arms for her defence. She asks not a dollar from the Confederate Government, and even offers to pay export and import duties, (which the Confederacy has no right to demand) on all she sends out and brings in. At this point she is met with a refusal to permit her vessels to clear, unless she will submit to such onerous terms as the Confederate Executive may choose to dictate. Can this action be sustained under any law of Congress, or upon any principle of enlightened or sound policy? Is it not a palpable assumption of power, and an utter disregard of every principle of State Rights and State Sovereignty?

I trust Congress when it again assembles, acting upon principles of enlightened statesmanship, will not only remove these obstacles by enactments too plain and stringent to be disregarded, but that they will invite and encourage the several States, free of hindrance or duty, to import all the army supplies and articles of absolute necessity, which the means at their command may enable them to do.

Should this expectation be disappointed I am satisfied it would be sound policy on the part of this State to purchase several vessels, and to import upon them such supplies as may be needed by our troops, and for State use. The State should also export a sufficient quantity of cotton, to place gold enough upon the other side, to enable her to again equip the State Road at the end of the war. In common with other Southern Roads, its iron will be much worn, and its rolling stock nearly run down, and if some forecast is not

exercised, the State will not have the means at her command to put it in running order. This may be provided for in the manner above indicated with but little cost.

If the legislature will appropriate \$2,000,000 in currency, and authorize me to purchase vessels and cotton, and to draw upon the cotton on the other side when necessary to pay for them or to purchase more cotton for shipment, if the blockade does not become more stringent, with the State's usual good luck when her affairs are well managed, I am firmly impressed with the belief that I can put gold enough to her credit in Europe in one year to repair the Road within six months after a treaty of peace, or to pay a large proportion of the appropriations of the current year. To accomplish this the State must not be interrupted by Confederate interference. The exchange which the cotton exported this year under all the embarrassments of a double blockade places, to the credit of the State, with the cotton now in store, is worth nearly double the whole sum expended by the State in the purchase of the cotton.

OUR FINANCIAL CONDITION.

As will be seen by the Reports of the Treasurer and Comptroller General, the public debt of Georgia, independent of the appropriations of the past year for the payment of which a sufficient tax has been assessed, and of the change bills issued which are payable in Confederate States Treasury notes, amounts to \$14,474, 270. Of this the bonded debt is \$6,086,250 of which \$216,000 being part due is drawing no interest. The remaining debt consists of \$6,993,000 in Treasury notes, and \$1,395,000 in Treasury Certificates of Deposit. These notes and certificates bear no interest and the State will not be called on to redeem them in specie or bonds till six months after a treaty of peace.

Of the above \$2,670,750 is the old bonded debt which existed at the commencement of the war, incurred chiefly on account of the construction of the Western and Atlantic Railroad which is the property of the State, and for stock in the Atlantic and Gulf Road.

To meet her liabilities the State has public property consisting of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, Bank stock, and Railroad stock, valued before the depreciation of the currency at \$8,840,124.68. And her whole taxable property worth over \$700,000,000 upon a specie basis.

The debt to be paid in Confederate Treasury notes is \$1,411,442 of change bills, and \$8,095,000 payable in new issue of Confederate Treasury notes 25th December next, which by the terms of the contract are to be presented for payment by 25th March next, or the State is not bound to

redeem them. but they are to be receivable in payment of public dues at any future time.

To redeem these notes and the undrawn appropriations of the past year, there is now in the Treasury \$2,146,087 and a balance still due on the tax digest, about sufficient to cover the whole amount. But as some of the counties whose digests have been returned have since been thrown within the enemies lines, it may not be possible if the enemy is not driven back, to collect a sufficient sum within the time to pay all these notes when presented.

In that event I respectfully recommend that provision be made for the issue and sale of seven per cent bonds running 20 years with semi-annual coupons, to raise the Confederate currency necessary to pay the debt, which it is believed would command a high premium, or that new State notes be issued upon the same terms as the notes to be redeemed payable in new issue of Confederate notes one year after date, which could be exchanged it is believed for Confederate notes with which to make the payment. This would enable the State to pay the debt in Confederate notes as soon as the taxes can be collected.

I also recommend that the appropriations of the present fiscal year be provided for by the issue of similar notes payable in Confederate Treasury notes, so as to enable the State to pay the appropriations out of the taxes of each year when collected, and that sufficient tax be assessed to meet all the appropriations made. As the money must be used during the year and the taxes of each year are paid during the latter part of the year, it becomes necessary to issue these notes to meet the demands of the Treasury till the taxes can be collected.

As I stated in a former message no prudent man will now give his note for property at present rates payable in specie after the war; nor will he borrow the present currency if he is obliged to use it, and give his note for it at par payable in lawful money after the war, but he will sell property even if it exposes him to much inconvenience and raise the currency which he is obliged to use. If no member of the General Assembly and no prudent constituent of any member will raise currency for his own uses and give for it his obligation for specie after the war, no legislator should do it for the State, which is composed of the members and their constituents. If it becomes necessary to sell some portion of our property to raise the currency necessary to meet the demands upon the Treasury we should do it without hesitation, rather than incur an enormous debt in currency to be paid out of our property and that of our posterity in future at specie rates. In imposing the necessary taxes the law should make provision for the exemption of the property of the poor who cannot sell prop-

erty to pay a heavy tax and live; and should place the burden mainly upon the wealth of the State where it can be borne without causing suffering or want. As the poor have generally paid their part of the cost of this war in military service, exposure, fatigue and blood, the rich who have been in a much greater degree exempt from these should meet the money demands of the Government.

WESTERN & ATLANTIC RAILROAD.

As will be seen by the Report of the Superintendent of the Western & Atlantic Railroad the net earnings of the road have been \$1,117,522.48 for the fiscal year.

In addition to this about half a million of dollars have been made to this date, by the use of the rolling stock since the road was given up to the enemy, by the purchase of cotton mostly in localities threatened by the enemy, which was carried to points of greater safety and sold for a profit. The sales had not been made nor had that sum been realized at the date of the Superintendent's report. Part of the cotton now stored will soon be sold and the money paid into the Treasury and accounted for in the next report of the Superintendent.

When we had rolling stock which could be spared from Government transportation I thought this a legitimate business. When the road was taken possession of by the enemy and our engines and cars sent to the interior of the State, I found it necessary to keep the most of the employees of the Road with the stock, that we might have them at command in case we recovered the road. As they were generally dependent upon their wages for the support of their families it was necessary to keep them upon such pay as would accomplish this object.

The loss of our engines and cars has been heavy. The raid under General Stoneman destroyed at Gordon and near Griswoldville seventeen passenger cars and thirty freight cars and seriously injured four engines. At the evacuation of Atlanta three of our engines and eighteen cars which were in the employment of the Government transporting ordnance and commissary stores were destroyed by order of Gen. Hood, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The families of part of the employees who have been driven out without shelter have been permitted to occupy a portion of the freight cars. The balance of the rolling stock when not engaged carrying cotton has been used on other roads to carry government freights for the supply of the army.

The Confederate Government owes the road, as will be seen by the Superintendent's report the sum of \$975,774.60. I have made every effort in my power to collect this but have not been successful. I trust the Government will not

much longer delay payment, which has been withheld from time to time under various pretexts.

TAX ON BANKS.

As the act of the last regular session imposed a tax upon both the assets and capital stock of the different Banks of this State, which amounts to a double tax, and as these corporations have not the advantages over the other pursuits in the State which they had before the war, on account of the suspension of their regular business which has been absorbed by the Confederate Treasury; and as they exchanged large amounts of their own bills with the Government at the commencement of the war for its notes as an accommodation, which have greatly depreciated in their hands; I doubted whether it was the intention of the legislature to make this discrimination against them. I therefore directed the Comptroller General to suspend the collection of the tax upon their Capital Stock and collect only upon their assets till your pleasure shall be known.

TAX ON COTTON.

As the law now stands cotton in the hands of all persons other than producers is taxable, but the cotton held by the producer in his gin-house from year to year as *investment* pays no tax. I can see no just reason for this discrimination. If the planter sells his cotton and invests the proceeds in bonds or other property they are taxable, as are almost every other species of property; but if he considers the cotton a better investment than currency bonds or other property, and holds it from year to year, it is exempt in his hands from taxation, while all other things of like value are taxed. If A purchases cotton which he holds as investment and B raises cotton which he holds from year to year for the same purpose. I confess my inability to see any just reason why the one should pay tax and the other be exempt.

INEQUALITY OF TAX RETURNS.

I call your special attention to that part of the Report of the Comptroller General which points out the inequality of the tax returns from the different counties under the present law, and respectfully recommend the passage of the Bill suggested by him, or one of like character, to remedy this evil and prevent future inequality and injustice between the people of the different counties. Each should bear its just part of the public burdens, which is not and will not be the case under the present law.

MILITARY APPROPRIATION.

As our State is invaded by a powerful enemy and it is impossible to foresee the exigencies which may arise within the ensuing year to require the use of our military force, or the extremities to which we may be driven, I recommend

the appropriation of ten millions of dollars as a military fund for the political year.

RELIEF OF SOLDIERS' FAMILIES.

I recommend the appropriation of six millions of dollars as a fund for the relief of indigent soldiers' families and sick and wounded soldiers, and indigent exiles.

While hundreds and thousands of our patriotic fellow citizens who are poor and without means to support their families in their absence, are standing as a bulwark between the enemy and the safety and property of the whole people whose homes have not been overrun, it is the imperative duty of the people at home to see that their families do not suffer for the necessities of life. I have constantly advocated this policy and feel the importance of it the more as the sufferings consequent upon the scarcity of provisions are increased in the State. The wealth and property of the State must be taxed to any extent necessary to prevent suffering among the families of our brave defenders. They have freely shed their blood in their country's service, and those who have money must be compelled to part with as much of it as may be required to cheer the hearts of the widows and orphans of the slain, and the distressed families of those still upon the field. Let our soldiers know that their loved ones at home are provided for, and you stimulate them to greater exertions and nerve them to nobler deeds.

The law should be so amended as to make it the duty of the Inferior Courts of the respective counties to make quarterly reports to the Comptroller General of the disbursement of the funds received by them, with a statement of the names of the indigent persons to whom the fund is distributed and the amount received by each. It is believed that the courts are not held by the present law to sufficient accountability.

The law should provide for the prompt dismissal of the courts from the trust, and the appointment of other agents to disburse the fund, when they fail to make legal and satisfactory returns, or to discharge any other of the duties imposed upon them by the statute.

Provision should also be made to enable the courts of counties containing refugees to draw enough of the funds of counties behind the enemies' lines to afford relief to such refugees when entitled, without the certificate of the court of the county of their former residence, upon other satisfactory evidence when the certificate of the court can not be obtained.

CLOTHING FUND.

I recommend the appropriation of two millions of dol-

lars as a clothing fund to be used for the supply of clothing to Georgia troops in service when they cannot get what is necessary to their comfort from the Confederate Government. While it is the duty of that Government to supply all its troops with comfortable clothing, if it fails to discharge that duty from inability or otherwise, Georgia should see that her sons do not suffer by such neglect. This fund should be used for the purchase of the necessary supply either in the Confederacy or in foreign markets as circumstances may show the one or the other to be the most practical with the least cost.

PURCHASE OF PROVISIONS.

The conscript law having been extended to 50 years of age, embraces much the greater portion of the planters of this State. Most of these men who make surplus supplies of provisions have received details from military service on condition that they sell to the Confederate Government all their surplus at schedule prices, which are now so far below market value as to afford not even the appearance of just compensation. In this way the Confederate Government prohibits the citizens of Georgia from selling their surplus productions to their own State, when the State needs these productions and is ready to pay just compensation for them. This makes it exceedingly difficult for the Quartermasters and Commissaries of the State to procure the supplies absolutely necessary for the State troops, indigent exiles, and others supported by the State. Under the order of Confederate officers that detailed men should sell only to Confederate Agents, the officers of the State during the past summer were driven out of her own markets, and were obliged to go to our sister state Alabama, and purchase corn and import it at a very heavy expense to the Treasury to save the suffering poor from starvation.

For a more detailed statement of the difficulties growing out of this prohibition you are respectfully referred to the official Reports of the Quartermaster General and the Commissary General.

Some of the other States have enacted laws which authorize the State officers to impress when in the hands of producers such supplies as are needed for State use. This in my opinion is the only mode of obviating the difficulty. Such a law should make ample provision to secure just compensation to the owners whose property may be taken. A confederate regulation cannot be defended upon any principle of reason or justice which drives a State out of her own markets for the purchase of her necessary supplies.

THE EXILES DRIVEN OUT BY THE ENEMY.

Your attention is invited to the deplorable condition of

the unfortunate exiles, who have been driven from their homes in Atlanta, and other parts of the State, by the savage cruelty of the enemy. The inhumanity of the treatment to which these unfortunate sufferers have been subjected, has probably no parallel in modern warfare, and but few in the history of the world. Thousands of helpless women and children, many of them widows and orphans of brave men, who have sacrificed their lives in the defence of the liberties of their country, have been driven from their homes, with but little of their clothing and furniture, and thrown out and exposed upon the ground to all sorts of weather, without food, house, or shelter.

I have had the best means in my power provided for their protection, and have ordered provisions issued to those who were entirely destitute. As I had no special appropriation for this purpose, I have used the Military fund, or so much of it as could be spared, not doubting that my course would meet your approval. Tents have been furnished to such as could not get shelter, and I have directed that log cabins be constructed, at a suitable locality, by the Quartermaster General, who has taken great interest in their behalf, for their comfort during the winter. The Quartermaster and Commissary General have done all in their power, with the means at their command, to mitigate the sufferings of this most unfortunate class of our fellow-citizens. I recommend that proper provision be made by law, to supply those who are destitute, with shelter, and the necessities of life, till they can provide for themselves.

GEORGIA HOSPITAL AND RELIEF ASSOCIATION.

Your attention is invited to the Annual Report of the Board of Superintendents of the Georgia Hospital and Relief Association. This association is composed of gentlemen of the highest character who have labored faithfully and successfully to alleviate the suffering of our sick and wounded soldiers. Their efforts merit the thanks of our whole people. It is doubted whether any other association with the same amount of means at command has accomplished as much good.

I respectfully recommend an appropriation of \$500,000 to be expended by the association as heretofore, during the ensuing year.

SCHOOL FUND.

As our schools cannot be conducted with success, till we have a change in the condition of the country, I recommend that the school fund, for the future, be applied to the support of the widows and orphans of our soldiers, till we can again revive our educational interests, with reasonable prospects of the accomplishment of good, by the distribu-

tion of the fund among the counties, for educational purposes.

DESERTERS AND STRAGGLERS FROM THE ARMY.

It is a fact that requires no effort at concealment since the late announcement of the President, in his speech at Macon, that our armies have been weakened to an alarming extent by desertion and straggling. The success of our cause, and the safety of our people, require prompt action to remedy this evil. Many of these men have fought gallantly, and have left their commands, under circumstances the most trying, to which human nature can be exposed. As our armies have retreated and left large sections of country in possession of the enemy, they have found their homes and their families thrown behind the enemy's lines, where the latter are subject, not only to insult and injury, but to great suffering, for the necessaries of life. Under these circumstances, their sympathy and care, for their families, triumphed over their patriotism and sense of duty, and in an unfortunate hour they yielded to their feelings, laid down their arms and abandoned their colors.

A strong appeal should be made to these men to return to their companies, and a free pardon should be extended to each one who will do so. This is already offered to them by Gen. Beauregard, and Gen. Hood and I have reason to believe would be granted by the General in command of each of the Military Departments. All who refuse to accept the pardon, and return, should be arrested, and sent forward with the least possible delay.

The civil officers of the State, in their respective counties, with the aid of the Military officers, when at home, and the patrol of each county, is believed to be the most effective, for the arrest and return, of deserters and stragglers, if placed by the laws of the respective States, under proper legal obligations, to act in this capacity. These officers, by the Constitution of the country and laws of the States, and of the Confederate States, are exempt from Confederate conscription, and should be required in consideration of the exemption extended to them, to keep all deserters and stragglers out of their counties, when not overrun by the enemy.

To compel the civil officers to act, as many of them are not inclined to do so, I recommend the passage of a law, authorizing the Governor to turn over the civil officers of any county, or any portion of them to conscription, when they refuse to act or to obey orders, for the apprehension of stragglers and deserters, from State or Confederate service, and if they cannot be turned over to conscription from age or otherwise, that they be subject to Militia duty, and to trial by court martial, for neglect of duty or refusal to obey orders. And that all necessary penal sanctions be added, to

compel the discharge of this duty. Proper provision should be made, by the Confederate authorities, to receive the deserters at convenient points, not too remote from any part of the State, and to pay jail fees and other necessary expenses promptly. The want of proper regulations, in this particular, deters many civil officers, who would be willing to act, from making arrests, as they have not money to spare, to pay the expenses, and do not know to whom or where they should deliver the persons arrested.

While it is the duty of the States to make provision to compel deserters and persons absent without leave, to return to their commands, an imperative obligation rests upon them to make such provision for the families of the needy as will secure them from want of the necessities of life, in the absence of their husbands and fathers. Whatever tax upon the wealth of each State, may be necessary for this purpose, should be assessed by legislators without hesitation, and paid by property holders without complaint.

ROBBER BANDS OF DESERTERS AND STAGGLING CAVALRY.

It is a lamentable fact that bands of deserters from our armies, and small bodies of cavalry belonging to the Confederate service are constantly robbing and plundering our people of their stock, provisions and other property. This is generally done by these robber bands under pretext of exercising the power of impressment, in the name of the Government or of some General, who not only knows nothing of their conduct but disapproves and condemns it. They go armed and take what they please by intimidation and force, having regard to neither age, sex nor condition. They are not amenable to any civil process as there is not generally sufficient force at home to arrest them, and they pass on and cannot in future be identified. If arrested and committed to prison they will aid each other to escape by force if necessary. They are lawless banditti and should be so treated.

I therefore recommend the passage of an act declaring all such outlaws, and authoring any citizen or association of citizens whom they may attempt to rob, to shoot them down or slay them in any other way in their power, and to band together and follow them when they have committed a robbery in any neighborhood and slay them wherever found. This is the only protection left our people at home against the depredations of these incorrigible thieves.

RANK OF THE QUARTERMASTER AND COMMISSARY GENERAL.

The gentlemen who fill these positions have labored incessantly and faithfully to serve the State and promote the public interest. I feel quite sure no two better officers fill similar places in any State in the Confederacy.

The Code only gives them the rank of Lieut. Colonel and allows the Governor no discretion in raising their rank no matter how deserving they may be of promotion. As I know of no other State which has failed to give higher rank to officers in these positions, I respectfully recommend as an act of justice that their rank be raised to that of Brigadier General.

GEORGIA MILITARY INSTITUTE.

Upon the advance of the enemy, in the direction of Marietta, I directed the Superintendent, Professors commanding, and Cadets of the Georgia Military Institute, to report to the Military commander for orders, and to aid in the defence of Atlanta, or such other points as they might be assigned to. The order was obeyed with promptness and cheerfulness, and they were, for a time, placed at the bridge at West Point, then at a position on the River in front of Atlanta, and finally in the trenches. In every position, they acted with coolness and courage, and won the respect and confidence of their commanders. Finally, when it became necessary to place troops at Milledgeville, for the defence of the Capitol, against the raids of the enemy, I ordered them to this place, where they are covered with tents, engaged in study part of each day, and the balance of the time attending to their duties as a battalion of troops. I have ordered them supplied with provisions by the Commissary, while engaged in this service, and it will be necessary to pay the Professors out of the Military fund, or to make a special appropriation for that purpose.

STATE LINE.

The two Regiments of the State Line have greatly distinguished themselves, for cool courage and intrepid valor upon the battle-field, and have rendered important service in the defence of the State. The ranks of these gallant Regiments have been decimated, and they are now greatly reduced. In the short period from the time they reported to General Johnston at the front, till the fall of Atlanta, they lost upon the battle-field nearly 500 men, many of them as gallant as any who have bled in freedom's cause. For a more detailed account of their services and losses, you are referred to the able report of the Adjutant and Inspector General of the State.

THE MILITIA.

The report of the Adjutant and Inspector General will afford all necessary information, connected with the organization of the Militia, which would have been a most thorough and efficient one, but for the interruption growing out of the Conscrip Act since their organization, and would

have enabled the State to bring into the field, for her own defence, when Atlanta was threatened, a force of some 30-, 000 men, after making all reasonable allowance for disability, &c.

Notwithstanding the difficulties with which the State authorities have had to contend, about 10,000 of the reserve Militia were armed and sent to the front, to aid in the defence of Atlanta, and other important points in the State. No troops in the service discharged their duty more nobly and faithfully. They received the commendation of General Johnston, General Hood, and their immediate commander Major General Smith, for their gallantry and good conduct upon the battle-field. When Atlanta fell they held the post of honor, constituting the rear guard, which brought off the reserve artillery of General Hood's army. After they had been ordered back to Griffin they were furloughed for 30 days, and have again assembled under their gallant leader, and are in the right place nobly defending the soil of their State.

In the Constitution of the Confederate States each State has reserved the right to keep troops in time of War, when actually invaded, as Georgia now is. Our fathers who formed the Constitution of the United States, from which we have taken this provision of our present Constitution, foresaw that no State could part with this right without an unconditional surrender of her sovereignty, which they were careful to provide against. The right of the Confederate States, if we admit the power of conscription, and of the State to raise troops, is mutual and concurrent. Each, in that case, has the same right in war when the State is invaded, to enlist troops into its service, and neither has the right to take them out of the custody of the other, when regularly received into its military service. This does not of course admit the right of the Confederate Government to enrol or interfere, with the officers, or necessary agents, of the State government.

As the present organization of reserve Militia is the only remaining force left to the State, she should, under no circumstances, turn them over to the unlimited control of the Confederate Government, or any other power. But she should retain the control over them that she may send them to the field, when the Military exigencies require it, and withdraw them at proper intervals, when her agricultural, and other material interests, imperatively demand it.

I turned over the organization first to General Johnston, then to General Hood, and now to General Beauregard, giving each the absolute command and control of the force, reserving only the right to withdraw it from their command, when, in my judgment, the safety of the State no longer required it in the field. This right will, of course,

be exercised with due caution, after free conference with the commanding General, as was the case when I granted the thirty days furlough, after the fall of Atlanta. This enabled the troops to save a very important crop of the State, much of which would otherwise have been lost, and caused no embarrassment to General Hood, in the execution of his plans.

CONVENTION OF GOVERNORS.

I transmit, herewith, a copy of Resolutions, adopted by the Governor's of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, convened in Augusta, on Monday, the 17th of October last, and respectfully recommend the enactment of such laws as are necessary to carry these resolutions into practical effect, so far as they contemplate action by the Legislatures of the respective States. I also request the exercise of your legislative influence to induce Congress to carry out such portions of the recommendations as are addressed to that body. It is proper, in this connection, for me to remark, that I do not wish to be understood by either of said resolutions, that I advocate the policy, in the present condition of our affairs, of arming our slaves. I do however advocate the use of them as teamsters, cooks, hospital servants, and in every other menial capacity, in which their services can be made useful, or in which they can relieve freemen from such pursuits that they may take up arms.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion I earnestly invoke the blessings of Almighty God upon your deliberations; and humbly pray that He will endow you with wisdom from above, and will guide and direct all your councils, till they result in the adoption of measures, and the enactment of laws, which, while they strengthen our forces, and give victory to our arms, will lead to wise and just negotiations, which may stop the war, with all its horrors, and secure the independence of the Confederacy, with the rights and sovereignty of the States unimpaired, thereby enabling us to maintain, to the latest generation, the inestimable blessings of civil and religious liberty, protected by adequate Constitutional guarantees.

JOSEPH E. BROWN.

Handwritten text in a cursive script, oriented vertically. The text is written in dark ink on a light, textured background. The characters are highly stylized and difficult to decipher, but appear to be a series of connected letters or symbols.

D.

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Hon. Paul Lawrence
Hutchinson
North Carolina

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